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In this paper we consider a two-country model. Each country is characterised by several 
different sources of nominal inertia. This distinguishes our model from others in the so called 
New Open Economy Macroeconomics and makes it a suitable framework within which 
analyse the stabilising properties of monetary policies. We show that the variance of inflation 
induced by domestic inflationary shocks is lower under CPI targeting than when we target a 
measure of output price inflation. In fact, market segmentation and staggered wage and price 
setting result in lower and more persistent foreign inflation responses to a domestic 
inflationary shocks. This inertia in foreign price adjustments is completely passed through 
into CPI inflation but not into output price inflation. These differences cannot be detected in 
traditional models that usually introduce sluggish adjustments of domestic output prices as 
the only source of inertia. Furthermore, we find a limited role for the exchange rate in 
affecting the stabilising properties of the rules.  
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0. Introduction 
 
Much of the contemporary analysis of optimal monetary policy forms part of the 
emerging macroeconomic consensus as embodied in the New Neo-Classical Synthesis (see 
Goodfriend and King (1997) for a discussion), which seeks to incorporate real and nominal 
rigidities into general equilibrium models based on optimising behaviour to provide a 
coherent framework for the analysis of policy issues
1. However, the vast majority of this work 
is conducted within closed economy models and the optimal monetary policy rules that 
emerge from this analysis suggests that Central Banks should follow a Taylor rule (1993) 
which sets interest rate to minimise deviations of output and inflation from trend and target, 
respectively, with particular weight being given to the inflation target (see Woodford (2001), 
for example). It is only fairly recently that work has begun on assessing the robustness of 
these conclusions in the context of the open economy. In extending the analysis to an open 
economy, a key issue is what measure of inflation a central bank should target. In particular, a 
key point is whether consumer price inflation might be better target than output price 
inflation. Gali and Monacelli (1999) claim that a welfare optimising monetary policy for a 
small open economy should aim to stabilise completely the domestic price inflation. 
Similarly, Benigno (2001) shows that a policy pursuing domestic inflation stability is optimal 
even when financial markets are incomplete. Benigno and Benigno (2001a) considering two 
large economies find that the optimal combination of monetary policies is where both central 
banks stabilise producer price inflation. A corollary of their conclusions is that if both central 
banks respond optimally to the deviations of the producer price inflation from its planned 
path, there is no need for further international monetary policy coordination. Similarly, 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) reject the necessity of an international monetary compact since it 
does not provide better outcome than inward-looking monetary policies set to pursue 
domestic inflation stability. Dealing with a small open economy, Clarida et al. (2001) claim 
that the optimal monetary policies in open economies are isomorphic to those in closed 
economies. Essentially all these papers argue that monetary policy should seek to minimise 
the distortions caused by nominal inertia  (the only uncompensated distortion in the model) in 
an attempt to recreate the equilibrium that would emerge under flexible prices. However, 
these models are based on the assumption of complete exchange pass-through. In particular,  3
they assume that prices are set in the producer’s currency and that free-trade ensures that the 
law of one-price holds for individual goods, and purchasing power parity holds in terms of 
consumer price indices. Dealing with a two-country model and allowing for incomplete 
exchange rate pass-through in the setting of import prices, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and 
Corsetti and Dedola (2001), show that the exchange rate volatility can affect welfare. It 
follows that open economy variables such as the exchange rate, should be included in the 
optimal monetary rule. Similar results are obtained by Monacelli (1999) and Sutherland 
(2001) in the context of a small open economy. Aoki (2001) considering a two-sector model – 
one with sticky prices and one with flexible prices- shows that monetary policy should target 
inflation in the sticky price sector.  
In our paper we consider a two-country model. In each country there are two sectors: 
the intermediate goods sector and the final goods sector. Intermediate goods are used in the 
production of final goods in both countries. Final goods enter the consumption basket of 
domestic and foreign consumers. Furthermore, we assume that workers are monopolistic 
suppliers of differentiated labour services and they set their wages according to Calvo 
contracts (1983). Producers in both sectors are also monopolistic suppliers of differentiated 
goods. More precisely we assume that market power allows them to price discriminate 
between domestic and foreign markets. Therefore, breaking down the law of one price (LOP) 
we allow for different price dynamics of the same good in different countries. Finally, since 
firms in both sectors set prices in buyers’ currency
2 we introduce imperfect exchange rate 
pass-through. In fact, when a shock occurs and the exchange rate changes only a fraction of 
firms adjust prices to react to the exchange rate fluctuations. In this way we introduce many 
different sources of nominal inertia. In each country we have sluggish adjustment in nominal 
wages, in prices of domestic and imported intermediate goods and in prices of domestic and 
imported final goods. This makes our model a particularly suitable framework within which 
to address the question of what measure of inflation the central bank should target. In this 
paper we have chosen to restrict ourselves to consider two alternatives: output price inflation 
and consumer price index (CPI). The first choice is due the fact that, as already mentioned, a 
policy rule formulated in terms of a measure of output prices has been recognised as the 
optimal one even in open economy. However, most of these results have been derived in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1 The seminal publications in this area are Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996). For a survey of this literature see 
Lane (1999).   4
model where the sluggishness in output price adjustment is the only source of inertia. CPI 
inflation has been chosen since it is the measure of inflation targeted by central banks that 
implement an inflation targeting regime although other measures of inflation could be more 
appropriate
3. The exchange rate enters directly in the definition of CPI inflation, it follows 
that under this regime central banks implicitly react to change in the real exchange rate. Since 
the exchange rate react immediately to changes in monetary policies while other nominal 
variables typically adjust with some inertia then CPI inflation targeting may behave 
differently from rules that target a measure of output price inflation. Notwithstanding, Ball 
(1998) asserts that in open economy central banks should target the real exchange rate and 
respond to its changes to avoid excessive fluctuations of inflation and output. For this reason 
we consider rules that in addition to either output price inflation or CPI inflation target also 
the level of the real exchange rate or its changes.   
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines the model. In section 2 we 
explain how we calibrate our model. Section 3 details our results and shows that CPI inflation 
targeting implies lower volatility of inflation than output price inflation targeting. This results 
are due to a lower and more persistent response of foreign good prices to an inflationary 
shock in the home country. Therefore, we claim that the absence of this additional channel of 
distortion in previous studies can lead to some misleading conclusions. In our model, with 
sources of inertia realistically affecting pricing decisions in the home and foreign market at 
different stages of production, the movement in the exchange rate has only a limited role in 
affecting the stabilising properties of the rules, whether they target CPI or output price 
inflation. This is in contrast to models which make the simplifying assumption of complete 
exchange rate pass through, purchasing power parity (PPP) and a single source of inertia in 
the pricing of final goods. Section 4 concludes.  
 
1. The model 
 
This model consists of two symmetric countries denominated as Home (H) and 
Foreign (F).  Each country is inhabited by several different types of agents: consumers, final 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2  There is a fairly recent but already vast literature on the implications of local currency price (LCP) assumption. 
Examples include Devereux and Engel (1998, 1999) and Betts and Devereux (1996). 
3 Mankiw and Reis (2002) suggest that the central bank should stabilise a price index where the weight of each 
sector depends on the sector’s characteristics, including size, cyclical sensitivity, sluggishness of price 
adjustment and magnitude of sectoral shocks.    5
good producers, intermediate good producers, the government and the central bank. We 
assume that in each period a new generation of consumer is born and that all consumers face a 
constant probability of death. The introduction of overlapping generation allows us to derive a 
well-defined steady state for consumption, the terms of trade and the net financial wealth 
around which the model can be linearised (for a discussion of this point, see Ghironi (2000))
4. 
Intermediate goods are produced using only domestic labour inputs and sold to both domestic 
and foreign producers. The production function of the final good producer combines domestic 
labour and bundles of domestic and foreign intermediate goods. As with intermediate goods, 
final goods are sold in both markets. Therefore, the consumption bundles purchased by 
households and governments combine both domestic and foreign final goods. We assume that 
price to market (PTM) is possible and that prices are set in the buyer’s currency. For 
simplicity and to allow consumers in both countries to hold positive financial assets in 
equilibrium we assume that given its public expenditure choices, the government raises taxes 
to keep the public debt constant
5. Finally, the central bank is in charge of the monetary policy 
and sets nominal interest rates to respond to domestic and foreign shocks to the economy. We 
now proceed to outline the model, considering first the problem facing individual consumers, 
before aggregating across all consumers. We then turn to the pricing decisions of the 
representative firm in both intermediate and final good sector. The linearised version of the 
model required to render it suitable for numerical simulation is presented in an appendix. 
  
1.1 The Consumer’s problem 
  
Consider a typical home consumer  j  in the cohort s who derives utility from a basket 




) and disutility from 
providing labour services ( () , lj s). We assume that the expected value of the consumer’s 
utility ( () , tt E Uj s   ) is obtained as follows:   
 
                                                           
4 Overlapping generations are also considered in Smets and Wouters (2001).  
5 Since we are not interested in considering interactions between fiscal and monetary policies, we do not allow 
the government to deviate from the zero deficit constraint. Moreover, insulating the economy from the effects of 
fiscal policies we are able to enhance the consequences of different monetary policy rules without affecting the 
main conclusions.    6
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where ι  is the probability of survival and  ρ  is the consumers’ discount rate. We assume that 
the parameters  t χ  and  t k  are strictly positive and that both ι  and ρ  are between zero and 
one. The basket of consumption goods is defined by the following index: 
() () ()
() γ γ − =
1
, , j C j C j C t F t H t  
where  () 0,1 γ ∈ .  () , , Ht Cj s  and  () , , Ft Cj s  are consumption CES sub-indexes of a continuum 
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with θ  (θ
∗ ) > 0 the elasticity of substitution among home (foreign) final goods. Given the 
price of each differentiated final good, the price of any consumption bundle is obtained as the 
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1 1 . 
The consumer can hold her financial wealth in the form of home government bonds 
( H B ), foreign bonds ( F B ) and money balances. Domestic bonds earn a nominal interest rate 
i, foreign bonds a return i
∗ . Consumers receive also shares in the profits of all domestic firms 
( (,) DIV j s ). Furthermore, it is assumed that the consumers receive a premium from perfectly 
competitive insurance companies in return for their financial assets should they die; this 
effectively raises the rate of return from holding financial assets by 
1
ι
. Finally, the consumer 
receives a wage  () Wi for any unit of labour supplied
6, consumes both domestic and foreign 
final good bundles pays lump sum taxes  () , Tj s  and receive lump sum transfers  () , TR j s . It 
follows that the consumer budget constraint in nominal terms is given by:  
                                                           
6 As it will be explained below, workers provide different labour services. Those who provide a labour service of 
type i  receive the nominal wage  () t Wi  7
() () () () () ()
() () () ()
( ) () () () ()
1






,, , , , ,
t
tH t H tF t F t H t F t t
t t
Ht Ft t t t t t t
Mj s
M j sP C j sP C j sB j sB j s
r r









+++ + = +
+ +
++ + + − +
 
where  t ε  is the nominal exchange rate. Deflating by  t P  we can rewrite it in real terms as 
follows: 
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where 
R
t ε  is the real exchange rate and  1 t r−  ( 1 t r
∗
− ) is the ex ante real interest rate paid at time t 
on home (foreign) bonds issued one period earlier. Since the non-arbitrage condition implies 



















From the first order conditions derived from the maximisation of the expected utility (1) 
under the budget constraint (2) we obtain the usual consumption Euler equation: 
() ( ) () 1 1 tt t t ECj r C j ρ + =+  





















Integrating the consumption Euler equation forward and substituting it into the intertemporal 
budget constraint we obtain the consumer’s consumption function:  
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From the first order conditions we can also easily derive the consumer’s demand for bundles 
































The domestic demands of a typical home and foreign final good are given by: 




























1.1.1  Labour supply and wage setting 
 
We assume that workers provide differentiated labour services indexed by  () 0,1 i∈ . 
Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, we assume the same generation structure within each 
labour service type. It means that for any cohort s there are 
s ι  workers for any type i. 
Workers of the same type are represented by a trade union which fixes the same nominal 
wage for all its members. There are different trade unions for any type of labour service. 
Therefore, we label the trade unions with the same index i. Given the nominal wage  () t Wi, 











The trade unions are monopolistic supplier of a given type of labour service. We assume that 
in any period each trade union has a constant probability () 1 W z −  of signing a new wage-
contract. Until a new wage-contract is signed the nominal wage is fixed. In the appendix we 
show that solving the optimisation problem of the representative trade union we have: 
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where 0 φ >  is the elasticity of substitution of labour,  () li is the per capita demand of labour 
service of type i and  t C  is the per capita consumption derived in the following section. The 
market power of the trade unions allows them to set the nominal wages above the discounted 
sum of marginal costs. Once the nominal wage  () Wi τ %  is set, the trade union fixes  () t Wi in  9









t s i l i l ι ι . We assume that 
the difference between what the trade union raises and what it pays to its members through 




1. 2  Aggregating across individual consumers 
 
By assuming that each cohort is of size 1 when born, a cohort of age t τ −  will have a size 
t τ ι
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The aggregate per capita consumption is: 
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where  t V  is the aggregate per capita human wealth after tax: 
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1.3 The firms’ problem 
 
Both the intermediate good sector and the final good sector are populated by a continuum of 
firms producing differentiated goods indexed by  () 0,1 ih∈  and  () 0,1 h∈  respectively. 
Consequently, we model each producer as a monopolistic competitor that fixes its prices as a 
mark up over marginal costs. Moreover, we assume that firms can charge different prices in 
                                                           
7 We can express all variables in terms of aggregate per capita as follows: consider the generic variable  () s χ , 
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the home and foreign markets. More precisely, we adopt the hypothesis of local currency 
price setting (LCP); in other words firms set the prices of their products in the buyer’s 
currency. Since intermediate good producers and final good producers face a very similar 
problem, we describe in detail only the optimal choice of the representative intermediate good 
producer. The same procedure can be applied to solve the problem for the representative firm 
producing a final good. 
 
1.3.1 Intermediate goods producers 
 
We assume that a typical intermediate good (ih) is produced using only domestic labour and 
a linear technology: 
() () tt t I ih Al ih =  
where  A is the home labour productivity and  () t li h   is a composite labour factor defined by 
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Consequently, the nominal marginal costs (MC ) faced by the representative firm in the 
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Following Christiano et al. (2001), we assume that only a fraction 1 I z −  of the firms can re-
optimised in any given period. All the other firms index imperfectly their prices to the last 
period inflation rate in the market of their products. Define 
i I Γ  as the degree of indexation to 
the past inflation in the domestic market of home intermediate good. If we assume that at time 
t a firm does not re-optimise, the prices it charges in the home and foreign markets are 
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  ∫   are the price indexes of 
domestic intermediate goods in country H and F respectively.    
Then the flow of present and future expected profits (Eτ τ Π ) in country H of the 
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% ,  H I  is the aggregate demand in country H for bundles of 
home intermediate goods, and  0 I θ >  is the elasticity of substitution across home intermediate 
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       +     =
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        +    =




where  H I
∗  is the aggregate demand in country F for home bundles of intermediate goods. We 
can write the price level of home intermediate goods in country H as follows: 
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Similarly, for the foreign market we have: 
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1.3.2 Final good producers 
 
A firm producing final goods combines domestic and foreign intermediate goods and 
domestic labour services according to the following Cobb-Douglas production function:  
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where  () ,0 , 1 αβ ∈  and  t D  is the technology used in the production of final goods.  t BH  and 
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As in the previous section, we can derive the optimal prices that a domestic final good 
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−−  =− −  .  p z  is the probability of not re-optimising while 
H Γ  ( H
∗ Γ ) is the degree of indexation to the past period inflation in the home (foreign) market. 
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where  t τ   is the amount of taxes raises by the government,  t g   is the government’s 
expenditure and  t b  is the amount of bonds issued by the government in period t. For the sake 
of simplicity we assume that the baskets of goods purchased by the government replicate 
exactly the private sector consumption indexes. As explained above, we assume that the 
government follows a rule to maintain its real debt constant (i.e. [ ) 1      tt bbt τ, − =∀ ∈ ∞ ). It 

















1.5  Demand side of the economy 
 
Before discussing the linearisation of the model, it is useful to specify the cost minimising 
demands for bundles of intermediate and final goods as well as the demand for labour. 
 
1.5.1 Intermediate goods 
 
The representative final producer’s demand for a domestic intermediate good ih is: 














where  () , Ht I h  is the demand of bundles of home intermediate goods of a typical final good 
producer in country H. Similarly, the demand for the foreign intermediate good if  is: 
















The demand of bundles of domestic intermediate goods of the representative home final good 
producer ( () , Ht I h ) is obtained in two steps solving the cost minimisation problem of the final 
good. Firstly, we derive the firm’s demand for bundles of intermediate goods  ( () t I h ) (i.e. the 
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Ht Yh  is the aggregate per capita world demand of the a 
typical home final good h. Then we can write the demand for bundles of home intermediate 
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where  , Ht I  is the demand for bundles of home intermediate goods in country H and  ,
w
Ht Y  is the 
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1.5.2 Final goods 
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where  , Ht Y  ( , Ht Y
∗ ) is the aggregate per capita demand for bundles of home final good in 
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Integrating across domestic firms leads to: 
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1.5.3 Labour demand 
 
As well as the demand for intermediate goods, the labour demand is obtained from the cost 
minimisation problem of the firms. Therefore, the demand for labour service of type j in the 
intermediate good ( ()
I
t lj ) is given by: 
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The aggregate labour demand for a typical worker  j  ( () lj ) is simply the sum of the previous 







Ht Ht It Ht t
t
tt t tt









   +    −
  =+             
  16



















β αβ β α φ










In parameterising the model, we assume a quarterly data period and the parameters we 
choose are given in table (3) along with the steady state values these imply. We do not 
distinguish between the elasticities of demand facing our imperfectly competitive firms in 
intermediate and final good sectors. The values we choose for θ  and θ
∗  are taken from Gali 
et al. (2001) and they imply a price mark up of 1.1.  
The quarterly discount rate ρ  is slightly lower than that found in other studies (such 
as Kollman (1998) or Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), for example). The reason for this is 
that these studies assume infinitely lived consumers. Therefore, the usual higher discount rate 
is equivalent to an annual real interest rate of around 3%. Since the overlapping generation 
structure of our model raises the real interest rate, this slightly lower rate of time preference is 
consistent with the same equilibrium real interest rate found in literature.  
The parameter ι  is the probability of survival for our consumers and it implies an 
average working life of about 35 years. This seems to be a plausible measure of average time 
spent in employment, although it is admittedly a high probability of death if the model is 
taken literally. Nevertheless, such a parameter is necessary to generate a plausible steady state 
value of government debt relatively to GDP
8.  
The parameters  I z  and  P z  are the probabilities that a firm in the intermediate good 
sector and in the final good sector respectively does not re-optimise prices in the next quarter. 
The value of 0.66 is taken from Leith and Malley (2002) and it implies that firms take on 
average nine months to reset their prices. They are also consistent with the estimates of Gali 
and Gertler (2001). Leith and Malley (op. cit.) provide also an estimate of probability  w z  that 
a new wage contract is set in the next quarter. The value of 0.74 implies an average length of 
wage contracts of about one year.  
                                                           
8 This point is also discussed in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2002). For a further exploration of this point see  also 
Faruqee et al (1997)  17
Finally, the degree of indexation to the past period inflation is set equal to 0.3. The 
value we choose imply that in the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve the weights 
associated to the forward-looking components and to backward looking component are 
approximately 0.76 and 0.23. These values are consistent with the estimates of Leith and 
Malley (op. cit.) and Gali and Gertler (op. cit.).  
The steady state these parameters imply are shown in table (2). The real interest rate 
has an annualised value of 3% and the steady state ratio of debt to GDP is around 70% which 
is consistent with the average level of debt in the euro area at the end of 2000 (ECB (2001)). 
The ratio of government spending to GDP is 23%. This value is also consistent with the data 
reported by Gali (1994) across OECD economies. Finally, the steady state values of the 
labour and intermediate good productivity are chosen in order to obtain a labour-income ratio 
of about 2/3 and a steady state value of aggregate per capita labour supply equal to 1/2 . 
 
3. Interest rate policy rules and shocks 
 
In this section we briefly discuss the policy rules we consider in our policy 
experiments. In closed economy, despite of its simplicity a Taylor rule seems to provide the 
best guidelines for a central bank if it aims to stabilise output gap and inflation around trend 
and target respectively. However, the same degree of consensus has not been reached in open 
economy. In particular, open economy models arise the issue of what measure of inflation 
should enter a Taylor rule. In this paper we do not aim to specify the best Taylor rule for our 
model. The relative weights that output gap and inflation should have in policy rules is still 
object of discussion even though recent research has moved towards the emphasis of the role 
of inflation volatility in the central bank’s loss function. Therefore, the optimal solution of the 
inflation-output variability trade-off requires the derivation of a microfounded welfare 
function which is beyond the scope of this paper. Although a term in output gap has to be 
introduced in policy rules, any choice at this point would be arbitrary. Therefore, we have 
chosen to keep our policy rules as simpler as possible in order to emphasise the consequences 
of targeting different measures of inflation. In fact, the properties of the policy rules we 
implement do not depend on the choice of not include a term in output gap. The policy rules 
we choose are reported in the table below: 
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Policy rule (1) simply targets the output price inflation while policy rule (2) targets CPI 
inflation. Comparing the dynamics of inflation and its variance under these rules allow us to 
asses some general properties of targeting different measure of inflation. Rule (3) is used to 
rule out the real exchange rate movement as a main source of excess inflation under output 
price inflation as it will be clear when we discuss the effects of a supply shock. In order to 
assess the properties of rules that react to movement in the exchange rate we modify the naive 
inflation targeting rules (1) and (2) adding a term for the level of the real exchange rate. 
Therefore, rule (4) targets output price inflation and the real exchange rate, while nominal 
interest rates in rule (5) respond to CPI inflation and the level of the real exchange rate. Rules 
(6) and (7) are similar to rules (4) and (5) but we replace the level of the real exchange rate 
with its first differences. In this way we can contrast the properties of these two different sets 
of rules. In fact, there is no consensus in literature on how the central bank should respond to 
movements in the exchange rate. In setting parameters for policy rules (4) and (5) we follow 
Taylor (2001) who claims that an exchange rate appreciation should induce the central bank 
to relax monetary policy. However, he suggests two different ways in which central bank can 
react to movements in the exchange rates: in the first case the central bank can adjust nominal 
interest rates whenever the real exchange rate is different from its steady state equilibrium, in 
the second case the central bank responds to changes in the real exchange rate. We consider 




We consider two different types of domestic shock. The first is a negative shock to home 
labour productivity. We assume that labour productivity decreases of 1% for four quarters and 
Rules α πΗ  α π   α ε  αε−1
1  1.5 0 0 0 
2 0  1.5 0  0 
3 1.5 0  1 0 
4 1.5 0  0.5 0 
5 0  1.5 0.5 0 
6 1.5 0  0.5 -0.5
7 0  1.5 0.5 -0.5 19
then gradually returns to its steady state value. The second is a positive shock to home private 
sector’s consumption. Similarly we assume a shock of size 1% that lasts for one year. 
Therefore we can evaluate our policy rules under both supply and demand shocks. 
 
3.1 Domestic supply shock 
 
Before discussing the simulation results of a shock to labour productivity under different 
policy rules, it is important to establish the general effects of this supply shock in our model. 
After a negative shock to domestic labour productivity, domestic firms in both sectors raise 
prices to protect their profits against the rise in real marginal costs; they also increase their 
demand of labour to offset the effects of the decline in labour productivity. The nominal 
interest rate rises in response to the increase in the inflation such that the real rates rise. 
Obviously, the exact magnitude of the rise in the nominal interest rate depends on the specific 
interest rate policy followed by the central bank. Consumption falls as a consequence of the 
rise in the real interest rate and this helps to offset the effects of the negative supply shock on 
inflation. However, in the home economy the inflation rises while output in both sectors falls. 
In contrast, in the foreign country the rise in inflation is accompanied by a rise in real GDP 
(deflated by the output prices) due to the improvement in the terms of trade. The real 
exchange rate appreciates because the response of the domestic monetary authorities is 
initially more aggressive than the foreign response. The initial appreciation of the exchange 
rate has a negative impact on the prices of imported goods and this further offsets the initial 
inflationary effects due to the labour productivity shock. In fact, the real exchange rate 
appreciation allows foreign exporters to charge relatively lower prices without reducing their 
profits. However, the subsequent depreciation of the real exchange rate represents an 
additional source of inflation for the home economy.  
 
3.1.1 Targeting output price inflation vs CPI inflation 
 
Under output price inflation targeting the initial appreciation of the real exchange rate (fig.5) 
is followed by a prompt depreciation, while under CPI targeting the initial appreciation is 
much smaller and the following convergence to the steady state is slower.  The real exchange 
rate behaviour reflects the dynamics of the gap between home and foreign interest rates  20
(fig.6). When the domestic shock occurs CPI inflation in the home country is mostly due to 
output price inflation. Similarly CPI inflation in the foreign country largely reflects the 
exportation of this inflation abroad. In other words, under output price inflation targeting the 
initial response of monetary authorities is relatively more aggressive in the home country and 
less aggressive in the foreign country. However, excluding the first quarter when the large 
appreciation of the real exchange rate reduces the size of imported inflation, CPI inflation in 
the county H is higher under output inflation targeting. In contrast, CPI inflation in country F 
is always higher under CPI inflation targeting, after the first quarter (fig.1). Furthermore, in 
country H, output price inflation is higher under output price inflation than under CPI 
inflation targeting. The opposite order applies to country F. The real exchange rate 
depreciation soon after its initial appreciation under output inflation targeting does not seem 
to significantly affect inflation dynamics, although it contributes to the inflationary 
consequences of the shock.  
 
Interpreting the results 
 
The explanation of these results lies in the dynamics of real marginal costs. The negative 
labour productivity shock dominates all other effects in the home economy and implies that 
the domestic firms’ marginal costs increase; but then the real marginal costs gradually return 
to the steady state value as the effects of the shock vanish. In contrast, in the foreign country 
the initial jump of the real marginal costs can be either positive or negative. For intermediate 
good producers the real marginal costs decrease because of the fall in foreign real wages. For 
a final-good producer these effects are offset by rises in prices of imported intermediate 
goods. As a consequence, we observe that real marginal costs rises for the foreign producers 
who sell their good in country F. However, for the final good exporters who can benefit from 
the real exchange rate appreciation the real marginal costs initially fall. It is important to note 
that the initial gap between output price inflation and CPI inflation induces a rise in foreign 
firms’ real marginal costs. Therefore, whatever is the direction of the initial jump foreign 
firms’ real marginal costs rise. This pushes the foreign producers to raise prices to protect 
their profits against the rise in the marginal costs. The whole story can be better understood 
through an example Let’s consider a firm in country F that produces an intermediate good and 
sell it in the its country. The firm’s costs are given by wages paid to foreign workers. Firms  21
deflate nominal wages by the price they charge in foreign market, while workers evaluate real 
wages in terms of CPI. The shock produces a fall in real wages and a rise in CPI inflation. 
Foreign workers increase nominal wages to protect their real wages against the CPI inflation. 
This turns out in a rise in firms’ real marginal costs that after the initial fall are pushed above 
the steady state value. Firms react to the increase in real marginal costs raising prices to 
protect their profits. A similar explanation also applies to the final good producers. In other 
words, we can anticipate that in country F the domestic inflation is initially lower than the 
imported inflation but this order is reversed after few quarters (three or four quarters 
depending on the policy rule). Similarly, in the home country domestic output inflation is the 
main source of CPI inflation only at the beginning since imported inflation becomes relatively 
more significant within four quarters. When, in the home country, the monetary authorities 
target output price inflation, producers anticipate that after the initial aggressive response 
monetary policy in the home country will be less restrictive than under CPI inflation 
targeting. The opposite applies to the foreign country. The forward looking behaviour of 
producers then explains why domestic output inflation and CPI inflation are higher in the 
home country when output price inflation is targeted, and in the foreign country when CPI 
inflation is targeted. 
 
3.1.2 Rules that include the real exchange rate 
 
In introducing the real exchange rate term in policy rules we aim to pursue two different 
results. Firstly we want to establish how important is the depreciation of the exchange rate 
after its initial appreciation to explain CPI inflation in home country. Then we are interested 
in evaluating whether policy rules that include the real exchange rate or changes in the real 
exchange rate perform better than rule that does not provide any explicit role for the real 
exchange rate. 
 
Inflationary effects of the real exchange rate depreciation 
 
The first experiment aims to evaluate the contribution of the real exchange rate depreciation 
in producing higher CPI inflation in home country. A reasonable objection to the different 
outcomes in terms of CPI inflation when the monetary authorities target output price inflation 
rather than CPI inflation is that most of the excess inflation comes from the real exchange rate  22
depreciation after its initial appreciation. Under policy rule (3) monetary authorities target 
output price inflation and the real exchange rate. We assume that nominal interest rates 
respond quite strongly to deviations of the exchange rate from the steady state (we set this 
parameter equal to 1). We obtain a pattern for the real exchange rate that does not differ 
significantly from policy rule (2) in which nominal interest rates respond only to CPI 
inflation.  However, CPI inflation under a policy rule (3) that targets both output price 
inflation and the real exchange rate is similar to CPI inflation under a rule that targets only 
output price inflation. This allows us to rule out the real exchange rate as the main source of 
CPI inflation even in the first quarters after the shock and to conclude that the different 
behaviour of inflation depends on which inflation rate monetary authorities choose to target. 
 
Targeting the real exchange rate  
 
Policy rule (4) targets both output price inflation and the real exchange rate. Nominal interest 
rates respond to domestic inflation as in policy rule (1) but we have added an extra term to 
target also the real exchange rate. Similarly, policy rule (5) differs from policy rule (2) since it 
targets both CPI inflation and the real exchange rate rather than CPI inflation only. Our 
findings reveal that policy rules that explicitly include the real exchange rate perform better in 
reducing inflation as long as the real exchange rate target contributes to the tightening of 
monetary policy. In fact, the variance of inflation decreases in foreign country where the 
exchange rate targeting implies a more aggressive response to the inflationary effects of the 
shock. In contrast, the variance of inflation increases in home economy where the exchange 
rate stabilisation requires a relatively less aggressive rise in nominal interest rate. The rise in 
variance of inflation in home country reveals that the easing in monetary policy dominates the 
benefits coming from the real exchange rate stabilisation   
 
Nominal interest rate responding to changes in the real exchange rate 
 
Under policy rule (6) nominal interest rates respond to output price inflation and changes in 
the real exchange rate. This rule takes into account more explicitly that after an easing in 
monetary policy due to the real exchange rate appreciation, nominal interest rates have to rise 
to offset the inflationary consequences of the real exchange rate depreciation. In other words, 
rather than target the real exchange rate monetary authorities offset the additional source of  23
inflation due to the real exchange rate depreciation. The CPI inflation variance under this rule 
is lower than under rules in which nominal interest rates respond either to output price 
inflation only (1) or both to output price inflation and the real exchange rate levels (4). The 
reason of these findings lies in the rise of nominal interest rates, which is more aggressive 
than under the other two policy rules. As explained above the exchange rate channel does not 
seem to represent a main source of inflation. However, responding to the exchange rate 
changes monetary authorities respond more aggressively to an inflationary shock and this 
induces a fall in variance of inflation. Finally, with policy rule (7) nominal interest rates 
respond to CPI inflation and changes in the real exchange rate. Although the variance of 
inflation under this rule is slightly lower, the behaviour of CPI inflation does not differ 
significantly from policy rules that target CPI inflation alone (2). Our findings are consistent 
with results of other studies. For example Taylor (1999) finds that a policy rule reacting to the 
exchange rate does not yield a greater improvement in performance. The main explanation for 
this result lies on the fact that the initial appreciation of the real exchange rate is much smaller 
under CPI inflation targeting than under output price inflation targeting. It implies that the 
subsequent depreciation has negligible effects on nominal interest rate under this policy rule.  
 
3.1.3 GDP volatility 
 
After the labour productivity shock the GDP falls in country H (fig.3). Then a GDP stabilising 
policy requires a monetary expansion, while the inflationary consequences of the shock move 
the monetary authorities in the opposite direction. Therefore, after a supply shock monetary 
authorities in home country face a trade-off between inflation and output stabilisation. As 
already explained, in our paper we do not aim to calibrate an optimal monetary policy rule. 
However, even the very simply rules we are considering provide some useful insights. Policy 
rules that target output price inflation imply a relatively aggressive monetary response when 
the shock occurs. However, after this initial reaction monetary authorities are less aggressive 
against inflation than when they target CPI inflation. As a consequence GDP initially falls 
more heavily under policy rules that target output price inflation but it also converges faster to 
its steady state value. For example, policy rule (1) responding to output price inflation alone, 
produces the heaviest initial fall in home GDP which is, however, highest under this rule after 
five quarters. The properties of these different rules in stabilising GDP derive from the 
combination of these two effects.   24
 
3.2 Domestic demand shock 
 
Before discussing the effects of a shock to domestic consumption under different policy rules, 
it is useful to outline the general implications of such a shock in the economy. A domestic real 
demand shock pushes up output; consequently labour demand as well as real wages increase
9. 
The rise in real wages increases real marginal costs and induces firms to raise prices to protect 
their profits. Under the set of rules we consider, the monetary authorities, in order to offset the 
inflationary consequences of the shock, raise nominal interest rate such that real interest rates 
rise. Since, during the shock, consumers run down the holding of financial wealth, when the 
shock passes private sector consumption falls below the steady state level. Output falls below 
its steady state level while inflation is still positive because of the inertia in price adjustments. 
Since monetary policy in the home country is relatively more aggressive, the real exchange 
rate appreciates. The real exchange rate appreciation raises the relative price of home goods 
and this helps to offset the destabilising effects of the shock. In the foreign country, output 
increases because of the rise in exports while consumption initially falls because of the rise in 
real interest rates. In fact, the excess demand for foreign goods and the rise in imported 
inflation induces the foreign monetary authorities to raise interest rates in order to offset the 
inflationary consequences of the shock. The initial fall in foreign consumption helps to offset 
the inflationary effects of a rise in demand for foreign goods. However, because of the 
increase in private savings when the shock passes foreign consumption rises above its steady 
state level. 
 
3.2.1 Targeting output price inflation vs CPI inflation 
 
The main conclusions we have drawn for a supply shock are also valid for a shock to private 
sector demand. When targeting output price inflation (policy rule (1)), the monetary 
authorities initially react to the shock with an aggressive monetary policy (fig.7). In the first 
year, real interest rates are in fact higher under output price inflation targeting than under CPI 
inflation targeting (policy rule (2)). However the order is reversed after this period. 
Notwithstanding the initial aggressive monetary policy both CPI inflation and domestic 
                                                           
9 The rise in real wages is easily explained in terms of labour-leisure choice. Since consumption rises consumers 
wish to increase their consumption of leisure as well as goods.   25
inflation are higher under output price inflation targeting (fig. 2). In the very first quarter CPI 
inflation is practically identical under these two rules because of the deflationary effects of the 
real exchange rate appreciation. As in the case of a supply shock, these results can be 
understood by considering the fact that domestic output price inflation is higher than imported 
inflation only in the first part of the shock. This order is reversed after about a year. Then, 
forward looking producers anticipate that targeting output price inflation monetary policy 
carry out a relatively less aggressive monetary policy even though at the beginning they seem 
to react more strongly. 
 
Interpreting the results 
 
Once again, the simplest explanation of these results lies in the dynamics of marginal costs. In 
the home country workers initially raise real wages as a consequence of their labour-leisure 
choice. When the shock passes and labour demand falls real wages and consequently firms’ 
real marginal costs return gradually to their steady state values. Indeed, the return to the 
steady state is relatively fast since as explained above, consumption and labour demands fall 
below their steady state values. In the foreign country, after the initial jump, real wages 
decrease. This is due the fact that the consumers’ labour-leisure choice works in the opposite 
direction such that the fall in consumption due to the rise in real interest rates induces workers 
to reduce real wages. However, when consumption increases workers demand for higher real 
wages. In other words, workers’ behaviour initially reduces the rise in foreign firms’ marginal 
costs, before contributing to the persistence of the inflationary effects of the shock. 
 
3.2.2 Targeting the real exchange rate 
 
Under policy rule (4) nominal interest rates respond to deviations of output price inflation and 
the real exchange rate from their targets. In the home economy the variance of inflation is 
lower than in case in which nominal interest rates respond only to output price inflation. 
However, the fall in variance of inflation does not come from the relatively less volatile 
exchange rate under policy rule (4). The real exchange rate, after an initial appreciation 
depreciates with respect to its steady state value
10. Although less strong than the initial 
                                                           
10 The depreciation of the real exchange rate reflects the financial conditions of the countries. Foreign consumers 
hold positive financial assets and their consumption is above the steady state value. Both variables converge  26
appreciation, the real exchange rate depreciation is more persistent. Therefore, the real 
exchange rate targeting implies after an initial easing in domestic monetary policy a slower 
return of the nominal interest rate to the steady state value. In other words, the more 
aggressive monetary policy reduces the variance of inflation in the home economy. It is 
interesting to notice that in the foreign country, despite of the more aggressive rise in nominal 
interest rates, CPI inflation is always higher with policy rules that target output price inflation 
and the real exchange rate (4) than with rules (1) that target output price inflation alone. This 
is explained considering the way in which optimal prices are set. In fact, forward-looking 
producers’ anticipate that the real exchange rate targeting will implies a relatively less 
aggressive monetary policy. However, these results are reversed when monetary authorities 
target CPI inflation and the real exchange target (policy rule (5)). This result is simply due to 
the fact that the real exchange rate depreciation is insignificant and therefore monetary policy 
does not induce expectations of lower inflation.  
 
Nominal interest rates responding to changes in the exchange rates 
 
When nominal interest rates respond to output price inflation and to changes in the real 
exchange rate (policy rule (6)) the variance of inflation in the home economy is lower than 
when output price inflation alone or both output price inflation and the level of the real 
exchange rate are targeted. As in the case of a supply shock, responding to changes in the real 
exchange rate implies that the monetary authorities carry out a relatively more aggressive 
monetary policy. In fact, after the initial appreciation the real exchange rate rapidly 
depreciates. Responding to changes in the real exchange rate, nominal interest rates rise. In 
contrast, the subsequent appreciation of the real exchange rate is very slow and its impact on 
the nominal interest rate is negligible. For similar reasons the variance of inflation in foreign 
country increases. The same interpretation and the same conclusions apply also to policy rule 
(7) under which the monetary authorities target CPI inflation and respond to changes in the 




                                                                                                                                                                                     
slowly to their steady state value because of the overlapping generation structure. The opposite happens to home  27
3.2.3 GDP volatility 
 
The variances of GDP due to positive domestic demand shock (fig.4)under different policy 
rules can be interpreted as in the case of a supply shock. However, we should note that a 
demand shock does not raise an output inflation stabilisation trade-off. Both output and 
inflation increase after the shock, although the shock does not show any persistence on output 
while inflation return slowly to its steady state value. The variance of GDP in the home 
country is minimised when policy rule (6) is implemented. As explained, this rule implies the 
most aggressive response of monetary policy to an inflationary shock; since a demand shock 
move inflation and output move in the same direction this rule helps to stabilise GDP as well 
as inflation. It is also interesting to notice that the variance of GDP is slightly lower under 
policy rule (1) than policy rule (2). In other words, a pure output price inflation targeting 
produce a lower variance than when CPI inflation is targeted. The explanation for this results 
lies on the fact that the rise in real interest rate under output price inflation targeting is 
initially more aggressive than under CPI inflation targeting. Although as explained, this initial 
monetary policy response is not sufficient to generate expectation of lower future inflation, 
the rise in real interest rate helps to offset the effect of the shock on output. In fact, most of 
the variability in output is due to it initial jumping when the shock occurs. When the shock 
passes output immediately falls. Since under output price inflation monetary policy is 
aggressive in the very first part of the shock this helps to offset the initial rise in output and 




In this paper we have considered a two-country model. Each country is characterised by 
several different sources of nominal inertia: sluggish adjustments in nominal wages, in prices 
of domestic and foreign intermediate and final goods. Moreover, we have broken down the 
hypothesis of complete exchange rate pass-through introducing local currency price setting. 
Finally, market power allows firms in both sectors to price discriminate between domestic and 
foreign markets. In this framework we have analysed the stabilising properties of different 
inflation targeting rules. Our findings reveal that the variance of inflation in the home country 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
consumers whose negative financial assets position forces them to save and pay back their debts.   28
is lower under CPI inflation targeting than output price inflation targeting. As shown in the 
paper, the explanation of these results lies in the interaction between all the different sources 
of inertia. Finally, we have found a limited role for the exchange rate in affecting the 
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Fig.6 Real Interest Rate. Supply Shock 
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Fig.7 Real Interest Rate. Demand Shock 
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Table 1. CPI  inflation and GDP variance. Home Demand Shock 










Policy Rule 1  0.40403  0.12652  0.32543  0.02303 
Policy Rule 2  0.27183  0.20493  0.36134  0.02558 
Policy Rule 3  0.33282  0.16743  0.36151  0.02068 
Policy Rule 4  0.29267  0.19739  0.38936  0.020536 
Policy Rule 5  0.20892  0.11694  0.11581  0.024687 
Policy Rule 6  0.16785  0.14391  0.11934  0.02594 
Policy Rule 7  0.1821  0.14145  0.1387  0.02229 





Table 2. CPI  inflation and GDP variance. Home Supply Shock 










Policy Rule 1  3.52037  0.8461  2.96468  0.77721 
Policy Rule 2  2.06595  1.42765  2.40115  0.81448 
Policy Rule 3  3.73472  0.59864  2.15821  0.65452 
Policy Rule 4  3.15394  0.74879  1.93531  0.65176 
Policy Rule 5  10.40888  0.4334  0.59207  0.20935 
Policy Rule 6  9.90713  0.26446  0.51578  0.21047 
Policy Rule 7  8.51468  0.20316  0.81151  0.30724 
          ∗  Annualised Inflation 
 





    
 
 
                                     Table 3. Parameters and Steady State values 
Parameters Values Steady State Values
ρ   0.993 y  1 
θ   11 c  0.77 
φ   11 g  0.23 
ι  0.9929 t  0.25 
I z   0.66 b  2.8 
P z   0.66 m 1.03 
w z   0.75 l  0.5 
χ   0.01 w 1.33 
γ   0.6 
H I   1.548 
α  2/3  ∗
H I   0.774 
β   2/3 r  0.075 
A  6.9 e  1 




Log-linear version of the model for the home country 
 














                                                                                                              (1A) 
 
where δ is the steady state value of the interest rate. 
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Domestic demand for home intermediate goods: 
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Foreign demand for home intermediate goods: 
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Tax equation : 
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The terms of trade: 
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Intermediate goods producer’s real marginal costs in the home country: 
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Intermediate goods producer’s real marginal costs in the home country: 
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∗∗ =− − −                                                                                                    (17A) 
 
Ratio between domestic intermediate goods price and consumer price index in the home 
country: 
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Ratio between foreign intermediate good price and consumer price index in the home country: 
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Final goods producer’s real marginal costs in the home country: 
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Final goods producer’s real marginal costs in the home country: 
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Domestic CPI inflation: 
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Home country aggregate budget constraint: 
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The model is closed once we introduce a monetary policy rule for both countries. Variables 
representing technology or preference shocks are assumed exogenous.  We model their 
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Intermediate goods productivity: 
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